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Introduction 
 
According to the data compiled by the UN Millennium Development Goals 
Project, 40 million people are infected by the AIDS virus in developing countries, with 
26.6 million on the African continent.   About 93% of those infected with the AIDS 
virus cannot afford to buy the anti-retroviral medication which they need (1).   The Joint 
Program of the United Nations on AIDS believed that unequal access to treatment at 
acceptable prices is one of the main reasons for the low levels of survival in poor 
nations. 
 
Although it may seem a paradigm, the problem of access to patented medicine is 
not limited to anti-retrovirals for the treatment of AIDS, as notes Brook K. Baker.   In 
developing countries the poor are victims of a large number of infectious diseases such 
as tuberculosis, malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, and Chagas disease, for which 
there is little or no access to medication (2).  The treatment of other illnesses such as 
diabetes, asthma, heart disease and mental illness is insufficient as the medication 
available is beyond the purchasing power of a large part of the population. 
 
The 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Property Rights (TRIPs 
Agreement) states that all signatories are obliged to grant patents to pharmaceutical 
products.   As a result, the price of medicines has tended to increase, affecting people in 
developing countries.   The adoption of a patent system in these countries has harmed 
poorer people who cannot afford to buy medicine.   Nevertheless, the TRIPs agreement 
contains some provisions which allow countries to eliminate the negative consequences 
of granting patents.  
 
In this paper I argue that compulsory licensing is a fundamental tool that 
developing countries may use in certain conditions to ensure that poor people have 
access to necessary medicines.   This measure may produce positive social effects. 
Unlike developed nations, developing countries have rarely used the compulsory license 
as an instrument of public policy. 
 
Moreover, abuse of patent rights has often led to abuse of economic power. 
Compulsory licensing engenders competition, thereby reducing prices of medicines. 
Each WTO member also has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency to issue compulsory licensing. 
 
My thesis does not ignore the important role that patents play in fostering 
technological progress. My purpose is only to point out that compulsory licensing 
promotes social well-being to the extent that it obviates the drawbacks of a patent 
system. Finally, there is no risk of decreasing investment in research because the market 
in developing countries is not significant for multinational companies. 
 
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part analyzes the influence of the 
TRIPs agreement on the increase of prices of the pharmaceutical products in developing 
countries. The second part deals with compulsory licensing and the impact it has on 
innovation. The third part discusses the use of compulsory licensing as an instrument of 
public policy in developing countries. 
 
 
The TRIPs Agreement and the “patentablility” of medicines 
 
 
The TRIPs agreement, made in 1994 during the Uruguay Round, determined that 
all the signatories agree to establish a minimum standard of protection of intellectual 
property. Various themes were regulated by TRIPs, such as authors’ rights, brands, 
patents, confidential information and industrial designs. The application of these rules 
was ensured by the system of solution of controversies of the WTO, which improved 
the mechanism of resolving disputes which existed in GATT. 
 
TRIPs allowed for the patenting of products and processes which represent 
innovation and are suitable for industrial use. In this sense, protection of innovation was 
the main objective. Thus, the link between intellectual property was strengthened in 
such a way that repression of piracy should foster economic flows among the members 
of the WTO (3). 
 
Developed countries consider TRIPs a way to reinforce international discipline 
regarding intellectual property and protect investments made in R&D. The obligation to 
grant patens for inventions in all the fields of technology had a great impact in 
developing countries. Patents create incentives for innovation and publication of 
inventions, remunerating the inventor for the investments he makes.  It must be pointed 
out, however, that the patent system contains a cost represented by the possible abuse of 
power of the monopoly of the title-holder. The patent may also be used to block the 
inventive activity of third parties, which would obviously harm society.   It is important 
to note that in most cases government expenses on the management of the patent system 
are high. 
 
Various reasons are usually put forward to justify the need to concede patents of 
pharmaceutical products. Firstly, the discovery of new medication requires a long 
period of time and considerable investments. Secondly, pharmaceutical products can be 
copied and introduced on the market irregularly.    For many years patents were not 
granted to pharmaceutical products. In developed countries, it was only in 1976 that 
Japan passed legislation for the sector, while Switzerland adopted a similar measure in 
1977.   Spain, Portugal, Greece and Norway created patent systems for pharmaceutical 
products in 1992. Until the end of the 80s about 40 developing countries, including the 
most densely populated, did not have patent systems for medicines in general. This was 
based on the social importance of medication and on the belief that patents would lead 
to the abuse of the power of monopoly (4).     
   
The “patentability” of pharmaceutical products, agreed upon during the Uruguay 
Round, raised the price of medicine, affecting a large part of the population. As a result, 
the right to health was seriously affected since various social groups could not have 
access to the medicine they need. 
 
The TRIPs agreement does not only contain rules for the protection of 
intellectual property of interest to the developed nations. The members of the WTO 
considered it advisable to foresee exceptions to the general rule in order to enable the 
adoption of public policies in expressly determined situations. Article 7 states that the 
regime of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of innovation, 
and the transference and spread of technologies able to lead to financial and social 
welfare. There was an attempt to obtain a balance between the guarantee of intellectual 
property rights, decisive for the growth of trade, and the protection of values considered 
fundamental. Article 8 states that States can adopt the necessary measures to protect 
public health and nutrition as well as to promote public interest in sectors which are 
vital for social, economic and technological development. The measures adopted 
should, however, be compatible with the TRIPs agreement (5).  
 
Some exceptions were made by TRIPs to the general obligation to concede 
patents. Article 27 (2) authorizes members to restrict the concession of patents if the 
inventions may endanger human life or health.   Article 30, in its turn, allows States to 
restrict the exclusive privileges granted by the patents. For this to happen, some 
prerequisites must be present. The exceptions are to be limited to the rights of 
monopoly, and cannot prevent the exploitation of the patent or cause unreasonable harm 
to the legitimate interests of the patent holder (6). 
 
Despite the efforts made during the Uruguay Round, it was not possible to reach 
a definition of the expression limited exceptions in Article 30 of the TRIPs agreement. 
However, there is a close link between article 7 and article 30, which, when read 
together leads to the conclusion that States should make compatible the protection of the 
rights of the patent holder and the need to consider the legitimate interests of third 
parties (7).  It can be argued that in the case of illnesses like AIDS, developing countries 
can establish restrictions on the rights of patent holders in order to reduce the cost of 
pharmaceutical products and enable the poorer part of the population to have greater 
access to them. Countries have the right to regulate the exercise of the rights granted by 
the patent in order to fulfil the public good. In this context, compulsory licensing 
appears as an important instrument to increase the supply of medicines at lower prices.                                
                  
Compulsory Licensing and the TRIPs Agreement 
 
 
The first agreements on intellectual property, made in the XIX century, assigned 
compulsory licensing the task of solving problems created by the patent system. It 
authorizes a third party to manufacture, use or sell a patented invention without the 
authorization of the title-holder, under clearly stated circumstances (8).  Compulsory 
licensing will be granted in case of national emergency, or when a state wants the 
invention to have public use on noncommercial grounds. The license will not be 
exclusive and will be used only for the aim for which it was granted. Its main goal is to 
supply the domestic market in unusual situations. The title-holder is entitled to be 
remunerated when it is exploited by a third party. It is possible to appeal to the Judiciary 
Branch to review the governmental ruling that granted the compulsory license of certain 
inventions (9). 
 
As can be noted, States enjoy undeniable flexibility to adopt public policies in 
the field of health. Members of the WTO are free to determine the circumstances that 
characterize a national emergency, which are extremely important in the public health 
crises caused by epidemics or pandemics (10). During TRIPs negotiations, attempts to 
introduce criteria that would define the content of the expression public interest failed 
because   developing nations were uninterested in restraining flexibility to adopt 
governmental policies of health protection. Also, it was not possible to determine the 
meaning of situations of urgency, national emergency, noncommercial public use, and 
noncompetitive conducts. During the Uruguay Round, a proposal presented by India 
was accepted. It ensured ample freedom for countries to define such expressions (11). 
 
Article 31 allows for the concession of compulsory license in cases of abuse of 
power of the monopoly granted by the patent, or when public interest demands it. Such 
flexibility is essential for the adoption of public policies geared to protecting health. The 
increase in medication costs caused by the “patentability” of pharmaceutical products 
can be offset by regulatory measures that will enable social groups with a lower income 
to have access to medications. The objective to be achieved is to strike a balance 
between protecting intellectual property and promoting the well- being of the 
population. 
 Countries are not entirely free to interpret the provisions of The TRIPs 
agreement of the World Trade Organization. In the case India-patents, the WTO 
Appellate Body believed that the terms of TRIPs must be interpreted on the grounds of 
“common sense resulting from its context and in the light of the object and aim of the 
agreement”, according to the rules of the Vienna Conventions for the interpretation of 
treaties. Contradicting the wish of the pharmaceutical industry, the appellate body 
decided that the interpretation would take into account the text of the agreement 
accepted by members, and not the expectations of one of the parts. 
 
 
It is interesting to observe that developing nations have seldom made use of the 
flexibility of the TRIPs agreement. The Doha declaration about TRIPs and public health 
in 2001 maintained the flexibility of the Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round, which allowed the implementation of public policies that facilitate access to 
medications (12). On that occasion, it was pointed out that: “We stress the importance 
we attach to the implementation and interpretation of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ( TRIPs agreement) in a way which supports 
public health by promoting both access to existing medicines and research into, and 
development of, new medicines. Due to this connection, we are adopting a separate 
declaration”. In the same way, it was observed that members of the WTO are entitled to 
determine “what constitutes a national emergency or any other circumstance of extreme 
urgency”. The obligation to negotiate on the grounds of article 31(b) of TRIPs, before 
granting the compulsory license, disappears when, in good faith, a country states there is 
a situation of emergency. 
 
On that occasion, it was also necessary to avoid interpretations that would 
broaden the protection of intellectual property by TRIPs. The decision that nothing in 
the agreement would be interpreted in such a way as to prevent countries from adopting 
their own public health policies was of the utmost importance (13). The Doha 
declaration, however, did not address the possibility of the import of manufactured 
products through the concession of a compulsory license by other countries. It has been 
established, in this case, that the title-holder has the right to prevent the medication from 
being launched on other markets because his rights have not expired. From this 
perspective, compulsory licensing aims mainly at supplying the domestic market. 
                      
The fact that some countries are unable to benefit from the flexibility offered by 
TRIPs is particularly serious. Once it is granted, compulsory licensing does not produce 
the expected results due to the lack of technical ability of local industry. This problem 
was solved by the General Council of the WTO on August 30, 2003, by a decision that 
protected the flexibility of TRIPs, as it was agreed that countries that met some 
requirements would not be subject to the restrictions in article 31(F). The member 
countries of the WTO will be able to import medicines through compulsory licensing if 
domestic industry proves unable to supply the needs of the domestic market. This 
privilege is ensured to less developed members of the WTO and to any member who at 
any time notifies the Council of TRIPs Agreement of their intention to use the system, 
which is provided for in the decision of the General Council in cases of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, or in hypotheses of 
noncommercial public use. The decision of the General Council established a number of 
safeguards to prevent medications produced through compulsory licensing for 
developing countries from supplying the market of developed countries. Such 
safeguards include, among other requirements, the form, color, and type of packaging of 
the products sold. The decision, which will be interpreted and implemented in good 
faith, will deal with public health issues and will not aim at achieving goals of 
commercial or industrial policies. 
 
 Countries can indicate, according to domestic interests, the hypotheses for 
granting compulsory licensing. Carlos Correia points out that developing countries 
should use compulsory licensing to promote access to medications in the following 
situations: 
 
a) refusal to accept, which occurs whenever the patent-holder refuses to grant the 
required voluntary license in reasonable terms, when the non-granting of the license 
affects the availability of a product or the development of a new activity; 
 
b)  a declared state of national emergency, as in cases of natural catastrophes, wars or 
epidemics; 
 
c)  when there is a public health crisis, to ensure the population’s access to essential 
medications, or situations of public interest, including those of national security; 
 
d)  identification of anti-competitive behavior; 
 
e)  governmental use, to foster access to medicines on noncommercial grounds; 
 
f) when lack or insufficiency in exploiting the patent hinders access to health or 
prevents the development of a vital sector of the country’s economy; 
 
g) when a certain patent can be made use of through exploiting a preexisting patent, 
provided that the original patent covers an invention that represents an important 
technological advance; 
 
h)  public interest (14). 
 
 
The function of compulsory licensing and impact on innovation 
 
 
Debates about compulsory licensing are old. The theme was analyzed by the US 
senate in 1790, by the British House of Lords in 1851, and in Germany discussions 
started in 1853.  After this, it was necessary to make the benefits of the patent system 
compatible with the elimination of possible undesired effects. The patent-holder does 
not have absolute rights, and is subject to the laws that rule competition. In certain 
circumstances, the government can force the patent-holder to license his invention to a 
third party that will exploit it through the payment of royalties. By means of compulsory 
licensing, the government can exploit the object of invention directly, or allow a third 
party to do it, without the authorization of the title-holder, in order to perform public 
policies that facilitate access to medication of the low- income population. 
 
The effects of compulsory licensing are to increase competition, to supply the 
market, and possibly to reduce prices. It is considered, in certain cases, that access to the 
invention should have priority over the private interest of the patent-holder and his 
exclusive right to exploit it. In developing countries, the patent has a marginal effect in 
terms of encouraging innovation, with extremely negative consequences for social well-
being.   
 
 
The analysis of the costs and benefits of compulsory licensing is essential to use 
it as an instrument to create public policies by developing countries. Discouraging 
innovation is regarded as the main risk caused by compulsory licensing. The prospect 
that profits obtained from exploiting the patent could suddenly disappear would reduce 
the incentive to invest in innovations. It would be more beneficial to profit from 
investments made by third parties than perform one’s own research to develop a new 
product or productive process. It is also stated that inventors have little incentive to 
patent their inventions, and would rather keep them as industrial secrets (15). 
 
Up to now, there have been no empirical data to prove the thesis that compulsory 
licensing has reduced investments in R&D in developed and developing countries. 
Scherer concluded that compulsory licensing granted in the 40s and 50s did not limit the 
great progress of the North American economy in that period. The need to continue to 
be competitive in the future encouraged the industry to put a long-term investment plan 
into practice, even when compulsory licensing was granted. 
 
Shien believes that compulsory licensing affects innovation when the industry 
can anticipate its concession or when the market in which it will be applied shows great 
economic importance. The foreseeability of compulsory licensing can affect 
investments in markets of great importance. However, there will be reduced impact on 
innovation if royalties are paid according to the existing criteria for the licensing of 
products on the market. Non-predictable compulsory licensing may affect a company’s 
decision to invest, but the licensing may occur too late for the company to change its 
behavior. 
 
Research conducted by the British Pharmaceutical Executives suggested that, in 
extreme cases, compulsory licensing is harmful to innovation. This study addressed 
only innovation carried out by the licensor, but ignored the impact of compulsory 
licensing on the licensee, who often benefits from the “spillover effects” of original 
innovation (16). In 1977, F.M. Scherer conducted an important investigation that 
focused on almost seven hundred companies, 44% of which were subjected to 
compulsory licensing. This research states that companies subjected to compulsory 
licensing invested more in R&D (17) than companies that were not the object of a 
similar measure. This conclusion, which applies to pharmaceutical companies, shows 
that compulsory licensing did not cause a reduction in investments in R&D. 
 
 
In a recent study, Scherer analyzed the situation of companies that were subject 
to compulsory licensing or that were about to be subjected to this procedure. The 
companies investigated did not reduce investments in R&D because they intended to be 
competitive in the long run. 
 
From 1923 to 1993, Canadian legislation authorized compulsory licensing of 
medicines based on sections 4 (1) and 39 (4) of the Canadian Patent Act. The main 
effect of this policy was the development of a domestic industry geared to produce 
generic medicines. The Eastman Commission observed that between 1969 and 1983 
almost 80% of the licensing requests were granted, amounting to an average of about 
twenty compulsory licenses a year. Compulsory licensing did not affect innovation in 
Canada significantly, which may be due to the relative insignificance of the Canadian 
market when compared to the world market of pharmaceutical products (18). 
 
Moreover, it must be remembered that the market in developing countries 
represents little profit for the pharmaceutical industry. Data available show that the 
market in developing countries contributes less than 20% of the profits obtained by 
pharmaceutical companies. This percentage is reduced even more if the importance of 
each individual market is analyzed (19). Only a small share of the population, usually 
no more than 10%, has ample access to pharmaceutical products in developing 
countries. Adequate use of compulsory licensing in these countries would have 
extremely little impact on investments in R&D. Canada had ample use of compulsory 
licensing for more than fifty years and even so, the North American pharmaceutical 
laboratories never failed to invest in innovation. This occurred because during that time, 
the Canadian market was not significant for profits in the pharmaceutical industry (20). 
 
 
Compulsory licensing as a public policy tool in developing countries 
 
The use of compulsory licensing by developing countries will contribute to 
raising the degree of competition, which will certainly cause a reduction in the price of 
medicine.. If this is the case, there will probably be different prices according to the 
characteristics of each market. Strict rules of protection of intellectual property in 
developed nations helped consolidate this situation. It should also be remembered that 
the prices of pharmaceutical products are established taking into account the reality of 
the market in developed countries. For this reason, compulsory licensing leads to 
undeniable social benefits that can be translated into easier access to medication by a 
significant part of the population. 
 
 
Some authors state that it is necessary to analyze the kind of medicine to be 
licensed in order to determine the effect of compulsory licensing on investments in 
innovation. Certain products aim at the global market, for even if they are primarily 
destined for the market of developed countries, they are also useful in developing 
countries, which is the case of medicines to treat cancer and AIDS. Furthermore, there 
are specific drugs that meet the needs of developing countries and that fight diseases 
such as malaria or tuberculosis and some viruses found in Africa. 
 
These drugs are not a priority for the pharmaceutical industry, and this is the 
reason why public and philanthropic resources fund research in the area. The Center for 
Disease Control, and partnerships between the public and private sectors, like The 
International AIDS Vaccines Initiative and the Alliance for Tuberculosis Drug 
Development are examples of successful experiences in the research into medicines of 
interest to developing countries. Compulsory licensing for global drugs, when limited to 
developing countries, does not have a negative effect on investments in research in 
developed countries. 
 
In this case, companies respond to consumer demands, and if this remains 
unchanged, selective compulsory licensing, which is restricted to developing countries, 
will have little effect on innovation. If pharmaceutical industries invest funds on a large 
scale in the production of medicines used by developing nations, the general concession 
of compulsory licensing will probably affect investments in R&D. The first conclusion 
to be drawn, in the opinion of these authors, refers to the need to analyze compulsory 
licensing in a different way when dealing with global drugs or specific medications for 
developing countries. Possible compulsory licenses granted to produce drugs that fight 
AIDS would not have a negative effect on research in the area. The situation is different 
when medicines are produced for the specific treatment of some diseases typical of 
developing countries. The threat that there might be systematic use of compulsory 
licensing of such medicines might force pharmaceutical companies to avoid these 
markets. 
 
Another frequent argument refers to the potential negative effects of compulsory 
licensing on the attraction of foreign investment.   So far there have been no conclusive 
studies showing a link between the level of protection of intellectual property and the 
amount of foreign resources entering a country. Choices of investment are in fact 
influenced by the analysis of the potential for economic growth of a country and by the 
soundness of its institutions.   High levels of protection of intellectual property do not in 
themselves guarantee the transfer of technology to developing countries.   To reduce the 
risks of abuse, developing countries should use compulsory licensing in the specific 
circumstances defined by already existing laws.  
 
The use of compulsory licensing as a strategy to create public policies should be 
linked to a framework which ensures reasonable remuneration for the patent-holder.   
This would attenuate the effects of compulsory licensing on technological progress.   
Article 31(h) of the TRIPs Agreement requires that the patent-holder receive adequate 
remuneration, established case by case according to the value of the concession.   When 
compulsory licensing is conceded to repress anti-competition conduct, the remuneration 
may receive special treatment, in the terms of article 31(k).   It has already been 
suggested that this norm would allow the payment of reduced royalties, or even the free 
concession of the license. 
 
The main problem involving the concession of compulsory licensing lies in the 
value of the remuneration to be paid to the patent-holder.  The payment of royalties 
similar to those paid to the patent holder in the case of voluntary licensing would 
prevent, in practice, the fulfillment of the objectives of compulsory licensing (21). The 
situation changes when the issue is compulsory licensing conceded to repress anti-
competition conduct.   In this case, North American anti-trust authorities have 
established royalties at values ranging from 0.2% to 3 %, figures considered low by the 
market.   In other cases, compulsory licensing was conceded free as happened in the 
case Dell Corporation Vs Bus patents.  The establishment of high royalties for the 
compulsory licensing of medicines would have extremely negative effects on the poorer 
sectors of the population.   On the other hand, the establishment of royalties at low 
levels would enable the market to be supplied, thus contributing to raising the level of 
social welfare (22). 
 
Compulsory licensing is not widely used by developing countries to encourage 
access to medicines. Greater use of compulsory licensing in developing countries 
requires the existence of high levels of the protection of patents in developed countries.   
This factor would make it possible to adopt different prices according to the specific 
needs of each market.   The granting of compulsory licenses would increase competition 
and decrease the prices of pharmaceutical products in developing countries.   On the 
other hand, the price of medicines would tend to rise in the market of developed 
countries (23). 
 
For compulsory licensing to be an efficient tool to reduce the costs of the system 
of patents and provide greater social welfare, the ways in which it can be used must be 
clearly defined.   It would be wrong to believe that compulsory licensing is a panacea 
for all the problems of public health faced by developing nations.  Some questions are 
of a structural nature and need comprehensive policies which include the adoption of 
measures of different kinds.   It must also be acknowledged that compulsory licensing is 
an exceptional resource which should be used by governments in exceptional 
circumstances, established by law.   The rational use of compulsory licensing may favor 
the transfer of technology to produce medicines for countries in areas of vital interest 
for the health of the population. 
 
Developing countries should use the alternatives offered by the TRIPs 
Agreement and create legal tools and public policies to exploit the potentials offered by 
compulsory licensing to allow greater social equality in access to medicines.   In this 
context it is absolutely necessary to maintain the flexibility established by the TRIPs 
Agreement for this to happen.  The pressure for compulsory licensing not to be 
conceded and frequent attempts to interpret the TRIPs Agreement in a restrictive 
manner are extremely damaging to the interests of developing countries, and remove 
from them the chance to carry out public policies to prevent death and improve the 
health of a considerable part of the population (24). 
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